startuplessons.txt 26 KB

123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106107108109110111112113114115116117118119120121122123124125126127128129130131132133134135136137138139140141142143144145146147148149150151152153154155156157158159160161162163164165166167168169170171172173174175176177178179180181182183184185186187188189190191192193194195196197198199200201202203204205206207208209210211212213214215216217218219220221222223224225226227228229230231232233234235236237238239240241242243244245246247248249250251252253254255256257258259260261262263264265266267268269270271272273274275276277278279280281282283284285286287288289290291292293294295296297298299300301302303304305306307308309310311312313314315316317318319320321322323324325326327328329330331332333334335336337338339340341342343344345346347348349350351352353354355356357358359360361362363364365366367368369370371372373374375376377378379380381382383384385386387388389390391392393394395
  1. April 2006(This essay is derived from a talk at the 2006
  2. Startup School.)The startups we've funded so far are pretty quick, but they seem
  3. quicker to learn some lessons than others. I think it's because
  4. some things about startups are kind of counterintuitive.We've now
  5. invested
  6. in enough companies that I've learned a trick
  7. for determining which points are the counterintuitive ones:
  8. they're the ones I have to keep repeating.So I'm going to number these points, and maybe with future startups
  9. I'll be able to pull off a form of Huffman coding. I'll make them
  10. all read this, and then instead of nagging them in detail, I'll
  11. just be able to say: number four!
  12. 1. Release Early.The thing I probably repeat most is this recipe for a startup: get
  13. a version 1 out fast, then improve it based on users' reactions.By "release early" I don't mean you should release something full
  14. of bugs, but that you should release something minimal. Users hate
  15. bugs, but they don't seem to mind a minimal version 1, if there's
  16. more coming soon.There are several reasons it pays to get version 1 done fast. One
  17. is that this is simply the right way to write software, whether for
  18. a startup or not. I've been repeating that since 1993, and I haven't seen much since to
  19. contradict it. I've seen a lot of startups die because they were
  20. too slow to release stuff, and none because they were too quick.
  21. [1]One of the things that will surprise you if you build something
  22. popular is that you won't know your users. Reddit now has almost half a million
  23. unique visitors a month. Who are all those people? They have no
  24. idea. No web startup does. And since you don't know your users,
  25. it's dangerous to guess what they'll like. Better to release
  26. something and let them tell you.Wufoo took this to heart and released
  27. their form-builder before the underlying database. You can't even
  28. drive the thing yet, but 83,000 people came to sit in the driver's
  29. seat and hold the steering wheel. And Wufoo got valuable feedback
  30. from it: Linux users complained they used too much Flash, so they
  31. rewrote their software not to. If they'd waited to release everything
  32. at once, they wouldn't have discovered this problem till it was
  33. more deeply wired in.Even if you had no users, it would still be important to release
  34. quickly, because for a startup the initial release acts as a shakedown
  35. cruise. If anything major is broken-- if the idea's no good,
  36. for example, or the founders hate one another-- the stress of getting
  37. that first version out will expose it. And if you have such problems
  38. you want to find them early.Perhaps the most important reason to release early, though, is that
  39. it makes you work harder. When you're working on something that
  40. isn't released, problems are intriguing. In something that's out
  41. there, problems are alarming. There is a lot more urgency once you
  42. release. And I think that's precisely why people put it off. They
  43. know they'll have to work a lot harder once they do.
  44. [2]
  45. 2. Keep Pumping Out Features.Of course, "release early" has a second component, without which
  46. it would be bad advice. If you're going to start with something
  47. that doesn't do much, you better improve it fast.What I find myself repeating is "pump out features." And this rule
  48. isn't just for the initial stages. This is something all startups
  49. should do for as long as they want to be considered startups.I don't mean, of course, that you should make your application ever
  50. more complex. By "feature" I mean one unit of hacking-- one quantum
  51. of making users' lives better.As with exercise, improvements beget improvements. If you run every
  52. day, you'll probably feel like running tomorrow. But if you skip
  53. running for a couple weeks, it will be an effort to drag yourself
  54. out. So it is with hacking: the more ideas you implement, the more
  55. ideas you'll have. You should make your system better at least in
  56. some small way every day or two.This is not just a good way to get development done; it is also a
  57. form of marketing. Users love a site that's constantly improving.
  58. In fact, users expect a site to improve. Imagine if you visited a
  59. site that seemed very good, and then returned two months later and
  60. not one thing had changed. Wouldn't it start to seem lame?
  61. [3]They'll like you even better when you improve in response to their
  62. comments, because customers are used to companies ignoring them.
  63. If you're the rare exception-- a company that actually listens--
  64. you'll generate fanatical loyalty. You won't need to advertise,
  65. because your users will do it for you.This seems obvious too, so why do I have to keep repeating it? I
  66. think the problem here is that people get used to how things are.
  67. Once a product gets past the stage where it has glaring flaws, you
  68. start to get used to it, and gradually whatever features it happens
  69. to have become its identity. For example, I doubt many people at
  70. Yahoo (or Google for that matter) realized how much better web mail
  71. could be till Paul Buchheit showed them.I think the solution is to assume that anything you've made is far
  72. short of what it could be. Force yourself, as a sort of intellectual
  73. exercise, to keep thinking of improvements. Ok, sure, what you
  74. have is perfect. But if you had to change something, what would
  75. it be?If your product seems finished, there are two possible explanations:
  76. (a) it is finished, or (b) you lack imagination. Experience suggests
  77. (b) is a thousand times more likely.
  78. 3. Make Users Happy.Improving constantly is an instance of a more general rule: make
  79. users happy. One thing all startups have in common is that they
  80. can't force anyone to do anything. They can't force anyone to use
  81. their software, and they can't force anyone to do deals with them.
  82. A startup has to sing for its supper. That's why the successful
  83. ones make great things. They have to, or die.When you're running a startup you feel like a little bit of debris
  84. blown about by powerful winds. The most powerful wind is users.
  85. They can either catch you and loft you up into the sky, as they did
  86. with Google, or leave you flat on the pavement, as they do with
  87. most startups. Users are a fickle wind, but more powerful than any
  88. other. If they take you up, no competitor can keep you down.As a little piece of debris, the rational thing for you to do is
  89. not to lie flat, but to curl yourself into a shape the wind will
  90. catch.I like the wind metaphor because it reminds you how impersonal the
  91. stream of traffic is. The vast majority of people who visit your
  92. site will be casual visitors. It's them you have to design your
  93. site for. The people who really care will find what they want by
  94. themselves.The median visitor will arrive with their finger poised on the Back
  95. button. Think about your own experience: most links you
  96. follow lead to something lame. Anyone who has used the web for
  97. more than a couple weeks has been trained to click on Back after
  98. following a link. So your site has to say "Wait! Don't click on
  99. Back. This site isn't lame. Look at this, for example."There are two things you have to do to make people pause. The most
  100. important is to explain, as concisely as possible, what the hell
  101. your site is about. How often have you visited a site that seemed
  102. to assume you already knew what they did? For example, the corporate
  103. site that says the
  104. company makes
  105. enterprise content management solutions for business that enable
  106. organizations to unify people, content and processes to minimize
  107. business risk, accelerate time-to-value and sustain lower total
  108. cost of ownership.
  109. An established company may get away with such an opaque description,
  110. but no startup can. A startup
  111. should be able to explain in one or two sentences exactly what it
  112. does.
  113. [4]
  114. And not just to users. You need this for everyone:
  115. investors, acquirers, partners, reporters, potential employees, and
  116. even current employees. You probably shouldn't even start a company
  117. to do something that can't be described compellingly in one or two
  118. sentences.The other thing I repeat is to give people everything you've got,
  119. right away. If you have something impressive, try to put it on the
  120. front page, because that's the only one most visitors will see.
  121. Though indeed there's a paradox here: the more you push the good
  122. stuff toward the front, the more likely visitors are to explore
  123. further.
  124. [5]In the best case these two suggestions get combined: you tell
  125. visitors what your site is about by showing them. One of the
  126. standard pieces of advice in fiction writing is "show, don't tell."
  127. Don't say that a character's angry; have him grind his teeth, or
  128. break his pencil in half. Nothing will explain what your site does
  129. so well as using it.The industry term here is "conversion." The job of your site is
  130. to convert casual visitors into users-- whatever your definition
  131. of a user is. You can measure this in your growth rate. Either
  132. your site is catching on, or it isn't, and you must know which. If
  133. you have decent growth, you'll win in the end, no matter how obscure
  134. you are now. And if you don't, you need to fix something.
  135. 4. Fear the Right Things.Another thing I find myself saying a lot is "don't worry." Actually,
  136. it's more often "don't worry about this; worry about that instead."
  137. Startups are right to be paranoid, but they sometimes fear the wrong
  138. things.Most visible disasters are not so alarming as they seem. Disasters
  139. are normal in a startup: a founder quits, you discover a patent
  140. that covers what you're doing, your servers keep crashing, you run
  141. into an insoluble technical problem, you have to change your name,
  142. a deal falls through-- these are all par for the course. They won't
  143. kill you unless you let them.Nor will most competitors. A lot of startups worry "what if Google
  144. builds something like us?" Actually big companies are not the ones
  145. you have to worry about-- not even Google. The people at Google
  146. are smart, but no smarter than you; they're not as motivated, because
  147. Google is not going to go out of business if this one product fails;
  148. and even at Google they have a lot of bureaucracy to slow them down.What you should fear, as a startup, is not the established players,
  149. but other startups you don't know exist yet. They're way more
  150. dangerous than Google because, like you, they're cornered animals.Looking just at existing competitors can give you a false sense of
  151. security. You should compete against what someone else could be
  152. doing, not just what you can see people doing. A corollary is that
  153. you shouldn't relax just because you have no visible competitors
  154. yet. No matter what your idea, there's someone else out there
  155. working on the same thing.That's the downside of it being easier to start a startup: more people
  156. are doing it. But I disagree with Caterina Fake when she says that
  157. makes this a bad time to start a startup. More people are starting
  158. startups, but not as many more as could. Most college graduates
  159. still think they have to get a job. The average person can't ignore
  160. something that's been beaten into their head since they were three
  161. just because serving web pages recently got a lot cheaper.And in any case, competitors are not the biggest threat. Way more
  162. startups hose themselves than get crushed by competitors. There
  163. are a lot of ways to do it, but the three main ones are internal
  164. disputes, inertia, and ignoring users. Each is, by itself, enough
  165. to kill you. But if I had to pick the worst, it would be ignoring
  166. users. If you want a recipe for a startup that's going to die,
  167. here it is: a couple of founders who have some great idea they know
  168. everyone is going to love, and that's what they're going to build,
  169. no matter what.Almost everyone's initial plan is broken. If companies stuck to
  170. their initial plans, Microsoft would be selling programming languages,
  171. and Apple would be selling printed circuit boards. In both cases
  172. their customers told them what their business should be-- and they
  173. were smart enough to listen.As Richard Feynman said, the imagination of nature is greater than
  174. the imagination of man. You'll find more interesting things by
  175. looking at the world than you could ever produce just by thinking.
  176. This principle is very powerful. It's why the best abstract painting
  177. still falls short of Leonardo, for example. And it applies to
  178. startups too. No idea for a product could ever be so clever as the
  179. ones you can discover by smashing a beam of prototypes into a beam
  180. of users.
  181. 5. Commitment Is a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy.I now have enough experience with startups to be able to say what
  182. the most important quality is in a startup founder, and it's not
  183. what you might think. The most important quality in a startup
  184. founder is determination. Not intelligence-- determination.This is a little depressing. I'd like to believe Viaweb succeeded
  185. because we were smart, not merely determined. A lot of people in
  186. the startup world want to believe that. Not just founders, but
  187. investors too. They like the idea of inhabiting a world ruled by
  188. intelligence. And you can tell they really believe this, because
  189. it affects their investment decisions.Time after time VCs invest in startups founded by eminent professors.
  190. This may work in biotech, where a lot of startups simply commercialize
  191. existing research, but in software you want to invest in students,
  192. not professors. Microsoft, Yahoo, and Google were all founded by
  193. people who dropped out of school to do it. What students lack in
  194. experience they more than make up in dedication.Of course, if you want to get rich, it's not enough merely to be
  195. determined. You have to be smart too, right? I'd like to think
  196. so, but I've had an experience that convinced me otherwise: I spent
  197. several years living in New York.You can lose quite a lot in the brains department and it won't kill
  198. you. But lose even a little bit in the commitment department, and
  199. that will kill you very rapidly.Running a startup is like walking on your hands: it's possible, but
  200. it requires extraordinary effort. If an ordinary employee were
  201. asked to do the things a startup founder has to, he'd be very
  202. indignant. Imagine if you were hired at some big company, and in
  203. addition to writing software ten times faster than you'd ever had
  204. to before, they expected you to answer support calls, administer
  205. the servers, design the web site, cold-call customers, find the
  206. company office space, and go out and get everyone lunch.And to do all this not in the calm, womb-like atmosphere of a big
  207. company, but against a backdrop of constant disasters. That's the
  208. part that really demands determination. In a startup, there's
  209. always some disaster happening. So if you're the least bit inclined
  210. to find an excuse to quit, there's always one right there.But if you lack commitment, chances are it will have been hurting
  211. you long before you actually quit. Everyone who deals with startups
  212. knows how important commitment is, so if they sense you're ambivalent,
  213. they won't give you much attention. If you lack commitment, you'll
  214. just find that for some mysterious reason good things happen to
  215. your competitors but not to you. If you lack commitment, it will
  216. seem to you that you're unlucky.Whereas if you're determined to stick around, people will pay
  217. attention to you, because odds are they'll have to deal with you
  218. later. You're a local, not just a tourist, so everyone has to come
  219. to terms with you.At Y Combinator we sometimes mistakenly fund teams who have the
  220. attitude that they're going to give this startup thing a shot for
  221. three months, and if something great happens, they'll stick with
  222. it-- "something great" meaning either that someone wants to buy
  223. them or invest millions of dollars in them. But if this is your
  224. attitude, "something great" is very unlikely to happen to you,
  225. because both acquirers and investors judge you by your level of
  226. commitment.If an acquirer thinks you're going to stick around no matter what,
  227. they'll be more likely to buy you, because if they don't and you
  228. stick around, you'll probably grow, your price will go up, and
  229. they'll be left wishing they'd bought you earlier. Ditto for
  230. investors. What really motivates investors, even big VCs, is not
  231. the hope of good returns, but the fear of missing out.
  232. [6]
  233. So if
  234. you make it clear you're going to succeed no matter what, and the only
  235. reason you need them is to make it happen a little faster, you're
  236. much more likely to get money.You can't fake this. The only way to convince everyone that you're
  237. ready to fight to the death is actually to be ready to.You have to be the right kind of determined, though. I carefully
  238. chose the word determined rather than stubborn, because stubbornness
  239. is a disastrous quality in a startup. You have to be determined,
  240. but flexible, like a running back. A successful running back doesn't
  241. just put his head down and try to run through people. He improvises:
  242. if someone appears in front of him, he runs around them; if someone
  243. tries to grab him, he spins out of their grip; he'll even run in
  244. the wrong direction briefly if that will help. The one thing he'll
  245. never do is stand still.
  246. [7]
  247. 6. There Is Always Room.I was talking recently to a startup founder about whether it might
  248. be good to add a social component to their software. He said he
  249. didn't think so, because the whole social thing was tapped out.
  250. Really? So in a hundred years the only social networking sites
  251. will be the Facebook, MySpace, Flickr, and Del.icio.us? Not likely.There is always room for new stuff. At every point in history,
  252. even the darkest bits of the dark ages, people were discovering
  253. things that made everyone say "why didn't anyone think of that
  254. before?" We know this continued to be true up till 2004, when the
  255. Facebook was founded-- though strictly speaking someone else did
  256. think of that.The reason we don't see the opportunities all around us is that we
  257. adjust to however things are, and assume that's how things have to
  258. be. For example, it would seem crazy to most people to try to make
  259. a better search engine than Google. Surely that field, at least,
  260. is tapped out. Really? In a hundred years-- or even twenty-- are
  261. people still going to search for information using something like
  262. the current Google? Even Google probably doesn't think that.In particular, I don't think there's any limit to the number of
  263. startups. Sometimes you hear people saying "All these guys starting
  264. startups now are going to be disappointed. How many little startups
  265. are Google and Yahoo going to buy, after all?" That sounds cleverly
  266. skeptical, but I can prove it's mistaken. No one proposes that
  267. there's some limit to the number of people who can be employed in
  268. an economy consisting of big, slow-moving companies with a couple
  269. thousand people each. Why should there be any limit to the number
  270. who could be employed by small, fast-moving companies with ten each?
  271. It seems to me the only limit would be the number of people who
  272. want to work that hard.The limit on the number of startups is not the number that can get
  273. acquired by Google and Yahoo-- though it seems even that should
  274. be unlimited, if the startups were actually worth buying-- but the
  275. amount of wealth that can be created. And I don't think there's
  276. any limit on that, except cosmological ones.So for all practical purposes, there is no limit to the number of
  277. startups. Startups make wealth, which means they make things people
  278. want, and if there's a limit on the number of things people want,
  279. we are nowhere near it. I still don't even have a flying car.
  280. 7. Don't Get Your Hopes Up.This is another one I've been repeating since long before Y Combinator.
  281. It was practically the corporate motto at Viaweb.Startup founders are naturally optimistic. They wouldn't do it
  282. otherwise. But you should treat your optimism the way you'd treat
  283. the core of a nuclear reactor: as a source of power that's also
  284. very dangerous. You have to build a shield around it, or it will
  285. fry you.The shielding of a reactor is not uniform; the reactor would be
  286. useless if it were. It's pierced in a few places to let pipes in.
  287. An optimism shield has to be pierced too. I think the place to
  288. draw the line is between what you expect of yourself, and what you
  289. expect of other people. It's ok to be optimistic about what you
  290. can do, but assume the worst about machines and other people.This is particularly necessary in a startup, because you tend to
  291. be pushing the limits of whatever you're doing. So things don't
  292. happen in the smooth, predictable way they do in the rest of the
  293. world. Things change suddenly, and usually for the worse.Shielding your optimism is nowhere more important than with deals.
  294. If your startup is doing a deal, just assume it's not going to
  295. happen. The VCs who say they're going to invest in you aren't.
  296. The company that says they're going to buy you isn't. The big
  297. customer who wants to use your system in their whole company won't.
  298. Then if things work out you can be pleasantly surprised.The reason I warn startups not to get their hopes up is not to save
  299. them from being disappointed when things fall through. It's
  300. for a more practical reason: to prevent them from leaning their
  301. company against something that's going to fall over, taking them
  302. with it.For example, if someone says they want to invest in you, there's a
  303. natural tendency to stop looking for other investors. That's why
  304. people proposing deals seem so positive: they want you to
  305. stop looking. And you want to stop too, because doing deals is a
  306. pain. Raising money, in particular, is a huge time sink. So you
  307. have to consciously force yourself to keep looking.Even if you ultimately do the first deal, it will be to your advantage
  308. to have kept looking, because you'll get better terms. Deals are
  309. dynamic; unless you're negotiating with someone unusually honest,
  310. there's not a single point where you shake hands and the deal's
  311. done. There are usually a lot of subsidiary questions to be cleared
  312. up after the handshake, and if the other side senses weakness-- if
  313. they sense you need this deal-- they will be very tempted to screw
  314. you in the details.VCs and corp dev guys are professional negotiators. They're trained
  315. to take advantage of weakness.
  316. [8]
  317. So while they're often nice
  318. guys, they just can't help it. And as pros they do this more than
  319. you. So don't even try to bluff them. The only way a startup can
  320. have any leverage in a deal is genuinely not to need it. And if
  321. you don't believe in a deal, you'll be less likely to depend on it.So I want to plant a hypnotic suggestion in your heads: when you
  322. hear someone say the words "we want to invest in you" or "we want
  323. to acquire you," I want the following phrase to appear automatically
  324. in your head: don't get your hopes up. Just continue running
  325. your company as if this deal didn't exist. Nothing is more likely
  326. to make it close.The way to succeed in a startup is to focus on the goal of getting
  327. lots of users, and keep walking swiftly toward it while investors
  328. and acquirers scurry alongside trying to wave money in your face.
  329. Speed, not MoneyThe way I've described it, starting a startup sounds pretty stressful.
  330. It is. When I talk to the founders of the companies we've funded,
  331. they all say the same thing: I knew it would be hard, but I didn't
  332. realize it would be this hard.So why do it? It would be worth enduring a lot of pain and stress
  333. to do something grand or heroic, but just to make money? Is making
  334. money really that important?No, not really. It seems ridiculous to me when people take business
  335. too seriously. I regard making money as a boring errand to be got
  336. out of the way as soon as possible. There is nothing grand or
  337. heroic about starting a startup per se.So why do I spend so much time thinking about startups? I'll tell
  338. you why. Economically, a startup is best seen not as a way to get
  339. rich, but as a way to work faster. You have to make a living, and
  340. a startup is a way to get that done quickly, instead of letting it
  341. drag on through your whole life.
  342. [9]We take it for granted most of the time, but human life is fairly
  343. miraculous. It is also palpably short. You're given this marvellous
  344. thing, and then poof, it's taken away. You can see why people
  345. invent gods to explain it. But even to people who don't believe
  346. in gods, life commands respect. There are times in most of our
  347. lives when the days go by in a blur, and almost everyone has a
  348. sense, when this happens, of wasting something precious. As Ben
  349. Franklin said, if you love life, don't waste time, because time is
  350. what life is made of.So no, there's nothing particularly grand about making money. That's
  351. not what makes startups worth the trouble. What's important about
  352. startups is the speed. By compressing the dull but necessary task
  353. of making a living into the smallest possible time, you show respect
  354. for life, and there is something grand about that.Notes[1]
  355. Startups can die from releasing something full of bugs, and not
  356. fixing them fast enough, but I don't know of any that died from
  357. releasing something stable but minimal very early, then promptly
  358. improving it.[2]
  359. I know this is why I haven't released Arc. The moment I do,
  360. I'll have people nagging me for features.[3]
  361. A web site is different from a book or movie or desktop application
  362. in this respect. Users judge a site not as a single snapshot, but
  363. as an animation with multiple frames. Of the two, I'd say the rate of
  364. improvement is more important to users than where you currently
  365. are.[4]
  366. It should not always tell this to users, however. For example,
  367. MySpace is basically a replacement mall for mallrats. But it was
  368. wiser for them, initially, to pretend that the site was about bands.[5]
  369. Similarly, don't make users register to try your site. Maybe
  370. what you have is so valuable that visitors should gladly register
  371. to get at it. But they've been trained to expect the opposite.
  372. Most of the things they've tried on the web have sucked-- and
  373. probably especially those that made them register.[6]
  374. VCs have rational reasons for behaving this way. They don't
  375. make their money (if they make money) off their median investments.
  376. In a typical fund, half the companies fail, most of the rest generate
  377. mediocre returns, and one or two "make the fund" by succeeding
  378. spectacularly. So if they miss just a few of the most promising
  379. opportunities, it could hose the whole fund.[7]
  380. The attitude of a running back doesn't translate to soccer.
  381. Though it looks great when a forward dribbles past multiple defenders,
  382. a player who persists in trying such things will do worse in the
  383. long term than one who passes.[8]
  384. The reason Y Combinator never negotiates valuations
  385. is that we're not professional negotiators, and don't want to turn
  386. into them.[9]
  387. There are two ways to do
  388. work you love: (a) to make money, then work
  389. on what you love, or (b) to get a job where you get paid to work on
  390. stuff you love. In practice the first phases of both
  391. consist mostly of unedifying schleps, and in (b) the second phase is less
  392. secure.Thanks to Sam Altman, Trevor Blackwell, Beau Hartshorne, Jessica
  393. Livingston, and Robert Morris for reading drafts of this.