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- April 2006(This essay is derived from a talk at the 2006
- Startup School.)The startups we've funded so far are pretty quick, but they seem
- quicker to learn some lessons than others. I think it's because
- some things about startups are kind of counterintuitive.We've now
- invested
- in enough companies that I've learned a trick
- for determining which points are the counterintuitive ones:
- they're the ones I have to keep repeating.So I'm going to number these points, and maybe with future startups
- I'll be able to pull off a form of Huffman coding. I'll make them
- all read this, and then instead of nagging them in detail, I'll
- just be able to say: number four!
- 1. Release Early.The thing I probably repeat most is this recipe for a startup: get
- a version 1 out fast, then improve it based on users' reactions.By "release early" I don't mean you should release something full
- of bugs, but that you should release something minimal. Users hate
- bugs, but they don't seem to mind a minimal version 1, if there's
- more coming soon.There are several reasons it pays to get version 1 done fast. One
- is that this is simply the right way to write software, whether for
- a startup or not. I've been repeating that since 1993, and I haven't seen much since to
- contradict it. I've seen a lot of startups die because they were
- too slow to release stuff, and none because they were too quick.
- [1]One of the things that will surprise you if you build something
- popular is that you won't know your users. Reddit now has almost half a million
- unique visitors a month. Who are all those people? They have no
- idea. No web startup does. And since you don't know your users,
- it's dangerous to guess what they'll like. Better to release
- something and let them tell you.Wufoo took this to heart and released
- their form-builder before the underlying database. You can't even
- drive the thing yet, but 83,000 people came to sit in the driver's
- seat and hold the steering wheel. And Wufoo got valuable feedback
- from it: Linux users complained they used too much Flash, so they
- rewrote their software not to. If they'd waited to release everything
- at once, they wouldn't have discovered this problem till it was
- more deeply wired in.Even if you had no users, it would still be important to release
- quickly, because for a startup the initial release acts as a shakedown
- cruise. If anything major is broken-- if the idea's no good,
- for example, or the founders hate one another-- the stress of getting
- that first version out will expose it. And if you have such problems
- you want to find them early.Perhaps the most important reason to release early, though, is that
- it makes you work harder. When you're working on something that
- isn't released, problems are intriguing. In something that's out
- there, problems are alarming. There is a lot more urgency once you
- release. And I think that's precisely why people put it off. They
- know they'll have to work a lot harder once they do.
- [2]
- 2. Keep Pumping Out Features.Of course, "release early" has a second component, without which
- it would be bad advice. If you're going to start with something
- that doesn't do much, you better improve it fast.What I find myself repeating is "pump out features." And this rule
- isn't just for the initial stages. This is something all startups
- should do for as long as they want to be considered startups.I don't mean, of course, that you should make your application ever
- more complex. By "feature" I mean one unit of hacking-- one quantum
- of making users' lives better.As with exercise, improvements beget improvements. If you run every
- day, you'll probably feel like running tomorrow. But if you skip
- running for a couple weeks, it will be an effort to drag yourself
- out. So it is with hacking: the more ideas you implement, the more
- ideas you'll have. You should make your system better at least in
- some small way every day or two.This is not just a good way to get development done; it is also a
- form of marketing. Users love a site that's constantly improving.
- In fact, users expect a site to improve. Imagine if you visited a
- site that seemed very good, and then returned two months later and
- not one thing had changed. Wouldn't it start to seem lame?
- [3]They'll like you even better when you improve in response to their
- comments, because customers are used to companies ignoring them.
- If you're the rare exception-- a company that actually listens--
- you'll generate fanatical loyalty. You won't need to advertise,
- because your users will do it for you.This seems obvious too, so why do I have to keep repeating it? I
- think the problem here is that people get used to how things are.
- Once a product gets past the stage where it has glaring flaws, you
- start to get used to it, and gradually whatever features it happens
- to have become its identity. For example, I doubt many people at
- Yahoo (or Google for that matter) realized how much better web mail
- could be till Paul Buchheit showed them.I think the solution is to assume that anything you've made is far
- short of what it could be. Force yourself, as a sort of intellectual
- exercise, to keep thinking of improvements. Ok, sure, what you
- have is perfect. But if you had to change something, what would
- it be?If your product seems finished, there are two possible explanations:
- (a) it is finished, or (b) you lack imagination. Experience suggests
- (b) is a thousand times more likely.
- 3. Make Users Happy.Improving constantly is an instance of a more general rule: make
- users happy. One thing all startups have in common is that they
- can't force anyone to do anything. They can't force anyone to use
- their software, and they can't force anyone to do deals with them.
- A startup has to sing for its supper. That's why the successful
- ones make great things. They have to, or die.When you're running a startup you feel like a little bit of debris
- blown about by powerful winds. The most powerful wind is users.
- They can either catch you and loft you up into the sky, as they did
- with Google, or leave you flat on the pavement, as they do with
- most startups. Users are a fickle wind, but more powerful than any
- other. If they take you up, no competitor can keep you down.As a little piece of debris, the rational thing for you to do is
- not to lie flat, but to curl yourself into a shape the wind will
- catch.I like the wind metaphor because it reminds you how impersonal the
- stream of traffic is. The vast majority of people who visit your
- site will be casual visitors. It's them you have to design your
- site for. The people who really care will find what they want by
- themselves.The median visitor will arrive with their finger poised on the Back
- button. Think about your own experience: most links you
- follow lead to something lame. Anyone who has used the web for
- more than a couple weeks has been trained to click on Back after
- following a link. So your site has to say "Wait! Don't click on
- Back. This site isn't lame. Look at this, for example."There are two things you have to do to make people pause. The most
- important is to explain, as concisely as possible, what the hell
- your site is about. How often have you visited a site that seemed
- to assume you already knew what they did? For example, the corporate
- site that says the
- company makes
- enterprise content management solutions for business that enable
- organizations to unify people, content and processes to minimize
- business risk, accelerate time-to-value and sustain lower total
- cost of ownership.
- An established company may get away with such an opaque description,
- but no startup can. A startup
- should be able to explain in one or two sentences exactly what it
- does.
- [4]
- And not just to users. You need this for everyone:
- investors, acquirers, partners, reporters, potential employees, and
- even current employees. You probably shouldn't even start a company
- to do something that can't be described compellingly in one or two
- sentences.The other thing I repeat is to give people everything you've got,
- right away. If you have something impressive, try to put it on the
- front page, because that's the only one most visitors will see.
- Though indeed there's a paradox here: the more you push the good
- stuff toward the front, the more likely visitors are to explore
- further.
- [5]In the best case these two suggestions get combined: you tell
- visitors what your site is about by showing them. One of the
- standard pieces of advice in fiction writing is "show, don't tell."
- Don't say that a character's angry; have him grind his teeth, or
- break his pencil in half. Nothing will explain what your site does
- so well as using it.The industry term here is "conversion." The job of your site is
- to convert casual visitors into users-- whatever your definition
- of a user is. You can measure this in your growth rate. Either
- your site is catching on, or it isn't, and you must know which. If
- you have decent growth, you'll win in the end, no matter how obscure
- you are now. And if you don't, you need to fix something.
- 4. Fear the Right Things.Another thing I find myself saying a lot is "don't worry." Actually,
- it's more often "don't worry about this; worry about that instead."
- Startups are right to be paranoid, but they sometimes fear the wrong
- things.Most visible disasters are not so alarming as they seem. Disasters
- are normal in a startup: a founder quits, you discover a patent
- that covers what you're doing, your servers keep crashing, you run
- into an insoluble technical problem, you have to change your name,
- a deal falls through-- these are all par for the course. They won't
- kill you unless you let them.Nor will most competitors. A lot of startups worry "what if Google
- builds something like us?" Actually big companies are not the ones
- you have to worry about-- not even Google. The people at Google
- are smart, but no smarter than you; they're not as motivated, because
- Google is not going to go out of business if this one product fails;
- and even at Google they have a lot of bureaucracy to slow them down.What you should fear, as a startup, is not the established players,
- but other startups you don't know exist yet. They're way more
- dangerous than Google because, like you, they're cornered animals.Looking just at existing competitors can give you a false sense of
- security. You should compete against what someone else could be
- doing, not just what you can see people doing. A corollary is that
- you shouldn't relax just because you have no visible competitors
- yet. No matter what your idea, there's someone else out there
- working on the same thing.That's the downside of it being easier to start a startup: more people
- are doing it. But I disagree with Caterina Fake when she says that
- makes this a bad time to start a startup. More people are starting
- startups, but not as many more as could. Most college graduates
- still think they have to get a job. The average person can't ignore
- something that's been beaten into their head since they were three
- just because serving web pages recently got a lot cheaper.And in any case, competitors are not the biggest threat. Way more
- startups hose themselves than get crushed by competitors. There
- are a lot of ways to do it, but the three main ones are internal
- disputes, inertia, and ignoring users. Each is, by itself, enough
- to kill you. But if I had to pick the worst, it would be ignoring
- users. If you want a recipe for a startup that's going to die,
- here it is: a couple of founders who have some great idea they know
- everyone is going to love, and that's what they're going to build,
- no matter what.Almost everyone's initial plan is broken. If companies stuck to
- their initial plans, Microsoft would be selling programming languages,
- and Apple would be selling printed circuit boards. In both cases
- their customers told them what their business should be-- and they
- were smart enough to listen.As Richard Feynman said, the imagination of nature is greater than
- the imagination of man. You'll find more interesting things by
- looking at the world than you could ever produce just by thinking.
- This principle is very powerful. It's why the best abstract painting
- still falls short of Leonardo, for example. And it applies to
- startups too. No idea for a product could ever be so clever as the
- ones you can discover by smashing a beam of prototypes into a beam
- of users.
- 5. Commitment Is a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy.I now have enough experience with startups to be able to say what
- the most important quality is in a startup founder, and it's not
- what you might think. The most important quality in a startup
- founder is determination. Not intelligence-- determination.This is a little depressing. I'd like to believe Viaweb succeeded
- because we were smart, not merely determined. A lot of people in
- the startup world want to believe that. Not just founders, but
- investors too. They like the idea of inhabiting a world ruled by
- intelligence. And you can tell they really believe this, because
- it affects their investment decisions.Time after time VCs invest in startups founded by eminent professors.
- This may work in biotech, where a lot of startups simply commercialize
- existing research, but in software you want to invest in students,
- not professors. Microsoft, Yahoo, and Google were all founded by
- people who dropped out of school to do it. What students lack in
- experience they more than make up in dedication.Of course, if you want to get rich, it's not enough merely to be
- determined. You have to be smart too, right? I'd like to think
- so, but I've had an experience that convinced me otherwise: I spent
- several years living in New York.You can lose quite a lot in the brains department and it won't kill
- you. But lose even a little bit in the commitment department, and
- that will kill you very rapidly.Running a startup is like walking on your hands: it's possible, but
- it requires extraordinary effort. If an ordinary employee were
- asked to do the things a startup founder has to, he'd be very
- indignant. Imagine if you were hired at some big company, and in
- addition to writing software ten times faster than you'd ever had
- to before, they expected you to answer support calls, administer
- the servers, design the web site, cold-call customers, find the
- company office space, and go out and get everyone lunch.And to do all this not in the calm, womb-like atmosphere of a big
- company, but against a backdrop of constant disasters. That's the
- part that really demands determination. In a startup, there's
- always some disaster happening. So if you're the least bit inclined
- to find an excuse to quit, there's always one right there.But if you lack commitment, chances are it will have been hurting
- you long before you actually quit. Everyone who deals with startups
- knows how important commitment is, so if they sense you're ambivalent,
- they won't give you much attention. If you lack commitment, you'll
- just find that for some mysterious reason good things happen to
- your competitors but not to you. If you lack commitment, it will
- seem to you that you're unlucky.Whereas if you're determined to stick around, people will pay
- attention to you, because odds are they'll have to deal with you
- later. You're a local, not just a tourist, so everyone has to come
- to terms with you.At Y Combinator we sometimes mistakenly fund teams who have the
- attitude that they're going to give this startup thing a shot for
- three months, and if something great happens, they'll stick with
- it-- "something great" meaning either that someone wants to buy
- them or invest millions of dollars in them. But if this is your
- attitude, "something great" is very unlikely to happen to you,
- because both acquirers and investors judge you by your level of
- commitment.If an acquirer thinks you're going to stick around no matter what,
- they'll be more likely to buy you, because if they don't and you
- stick around, you'll probably grow, your price will go up, and
- they'll be left wishing they'd bought you earlier. Ditto for
- investors. What really motivates investors, even big VCs, is not
- the hope of good returns, but the fear of missing out.
- [6]
- So if
- you make it clear you're going to succeed no matter what, and the only
- reason you need them is to make it happen a little faster, you're
- much more likely to get money.You can't fake this. The only way to convince everyone that you're
- ready to fight to the death is actually to be ready to.You have to be the right kind of determined, though. I carefully
- chose the word determined rather than stubborn, because stubbornness
- is a disastrous quality in a startup. You have to be determined,
- but flexible, like a running back. A successful running back doesn't
- just put his head down and try to run through people. He improvises:
- if someone appears in front of him, he runs around them; if someone
- tries to grab him, he spins out of their grip; he'll even run in
- the wrong direction briefly if that will help. The one thing he'll
- never do is stand still.
- [7]
- 6. There Is Always Room.I was talking recently to a startup founder about whether it might
- be good to add a social component to their software. He said he
- didn't think so, because the whole social thing was tapped out.
- Really? So in a hundred years the only social networking sites
- will be the Facebook, MySpace, Flickr, and Del.icio.us? Not likely.There is always room for new stuff. At every point in history,
- even the darkest bits of the dark ages, people were discovering
- things that made everyone say "why didn't anyone think of that
- before?" We know this continued to be true up till 2004, when the
- Facebook was founded-- though strictly speaking someone else did
- think of that.The reason we don't see the opportunities all around us is that we
- adjust to however things are, and assume that's how things have to
- be. For example, it would seem crazy to most people to try to make
- a better search engine than Google. Surely that field, at least,
- is tapped out. Really? In a hundred years-- or even twenty-- are
- people still going to search for information using something like
- the current Google? Even Google probably doesn't think that.In particular, I don't think there's any limit to the number of
- startups. Sometimes you hear people saying "All these guys starting
- startups now are going to be disappointed. How many little startups
- are Google and Yahoo going to buy, after all?" That sounds cleverly
- skeptical, but I can prove it's mistaken. No one proposes that
- there's some limit to the number of people who can be employed in
- an economy consisting of big, slow-moving companies with a couple
- thousand people each. Why should there be any limit to the number
- who could be employed by small, fast-moving companies with ten each?
- It seems to me the only limit would be the number of people who
- want to work that hard.The limit on the number of startups is not the number that can get
- acquired by Google and Yahoo-- though it seems even that should
- be unlimited, if the startups were actually worth buying-- but the
- amount of wealth that can be created. And I don't think there's
- any limit on that, except cosmological ones.So for all practical purposes, there is no limit to the number of
- startups. Startups make wealth, which means they make things people
- want, and if there's a limit on the number of things people want,
- we are nowhere near it. I still don't even have a flying car.
- 7. Don't Get Your Hopes Up.This is another one I've been repeating since long before Y Combinator.
- It was practically the corporate motto at Viaweb.Startup founders are naturally optimistic. They wouldn't do it
- otherwise. But you should treat your optimism the way you'd treat
- the core of a nuclear reactor: as a source of power that's also
- very dangerous. You have to build a shield around it, or it will
- fry you.The shielding of a reactor is not uniform; the reactor would be
- useless if it were. It's pierced in a few places to let pipes in.
- An optimism shield has to be pierced too. I think the place to
- draw the line is between what you expect of yourself, and what you
- expect of other people. It's ok to be optimistic about what you
- can do, but assume the worst about machines and other people.This is particularly necessary in a startup, because you tend to
- be pushing the limits of whatever you're doing. So things don't
- happen in the smooth, predictable way they do in the rest of the
- world. Things change suddenly, and usually for the worse.Shielding your optimism is nowhere more important than with deals.
- If your startup is doing a deal, just assume it's not going to
- happen. The VCs who say they're going to invest in you aren't.
- The company that says they're going to buy you isn't. The big
- customer who wants to use your system in their whole company won't.
- Then if things work out you can be pleasantly surprised.The reason I warn startups not to get their hopes up is not to save
- them from being disappointed when things fall through. It's
- for a more practical reason: to prevent them from leaning their
- company against something that's going to fall over, taking them
- with it.For example, if someone says they want to invest in you, there's a
- natural tendency to stop looking for other investors. That's why
- people proposing deals seem so positive: they want you to
- stop looking. And you want to stop too, because doing deals is a
- pain. Raising money, in particular, is a huge time sink. So you
- have to consciously force yourself to keep looking.Even if you ultimately do the first deal, it will be to your advantage
- to have kept looking, because you'll get better terms. Deals are
- dynamic; unless you're negotiating with someone unusually honest,
- there's not a single point where you shake hands and the deal's
- done. There are usually a lot of subsidiary questions to be cleared
- up after the handshake, and if the other side senses weakness-- if
- they sense you need this deal-- they will be very tempted to screw
- you in the details.VCs and corp dev guys are professional negotiators. They're trained
- to take advantage of weakness.
- [8]
- So while they're often nice
- guys, they just can't help it. And as pros they do this more than
- you. So don't even try to bluff them. The only way a startup can
- have any leverage in a deal is genuinely not to need it. And if
- you don't believe in a deal, you'll be less likely to depend on it.So I want to plant a hypnotic suggestion in your heads: when you
- hear someone say the words "we want to invest in you" or "we want
- to acquire you," I want the following phrase to appear automatically
- in your head: don't get your hopes up. Just continue running
- your company as if this deal didn't exist. Nothing is more likely
- to make it close.The way to succeed in a startup is to focus on the goal of getting
- lots of users, and keep walking swiftly toward it while investors
- and acquirers scurry alongside trying to wave money in your face.
- Speed, not MoneyThe way I've described it, starting a startup sounds pretty stressful.
- It is. When I talk to the founders of the companies we've funded,
- they all say the same thing: I knew it would be hard, but I didn't
- realize it would be this hard.So why do it? It would be worth enduring a lot of pain and stress
- to do something grand or heroic, but just to make money? Is making
- money really that important?No, not really. It seems ridiculous to me when people take business
- too seriously. I regard making money as a boring errand to be got
- out of the way as soon as possible. There is nothing grand or
- heroic about starting a startup per se.So why do I spend so much time thinking about startups? I'll tell
- you why. Economically, a startup is best seen not as a way to get
- rich, but as a way to work faster. You have to make a living, and
- a startup is a way to get that done quickly, instead of letting it
- drag on through your whole life.
- [9]We take it for granted most of the time, but human life is fairly
- miraculous. It is also palpably short. You're given this marvellous
- thing, and then poof, it's taken away. You can see why people
- invent gods to explain it. But even to people who don't believe
- in gods, life commands respect. There are times in most of our
- lives when the days go by in a blur, and almost everyone has a
- sense, when this happens, of wasting something precious. As Ben
- Franklin said, if you love life, don't waste time, because time is
- what life is made of.So no, there's nothing particularly grand about making money. That's
- not what makes startups worth the trouble. What's important about
- startups is the speed. By compressing the dull but necessary task
- of making a living into the smallest possible time, you show respect
- for life, and there is something grand about that.Notes[1]
- Startups can die from releasing something full of bugs, and not
- fixing them fast enough, but I don't know of any that died from
- releasing something stable but minimal very early, then promptly
- improving it.[2]
- I know this is why I haven't released Arc. The moment I do,
- I'll have people nagging me for features.[3]
- A web site is different from a book or movie or desktop application
- in this respect. Users judge a site not as a single snapshot, but
- as an animation with multiple frames. Of the two, I'd say the rate of
- improvement is more important to users than where you currently
- are.[4]
- It should not always tell this to users, however. For example,
- MySpace is basically a replacement mall for mallrats. But it was
- wiser for them, initially, to pretend that the site was about bands.[5]
- Similarly, don't make users register to try your site. Maybe
- what you have is so valuable that visitors should gladly register
- to get at it. But they've been trained to expect the opposite.
- Most of the things they've tried on the web have sucked-- and
- probably especially those that made them register.[6]
- VCs have rational reasons for behaving this way. They don't
- make their money (if they make money) off their median investments.
- In a typical fund, half the companies fail, most of the rest generate
- mediocre returns, and one or two "make the fund" by succeeding
- spectacularly. So if they miss just a few of the most promising
- opportunities, it could hose the whole fund.[7]
- The attitude of a running back doesn't translate to soccer.
- Though it looks great when a forward dribbles past multiple defenders,
- a player who persists in trying such things will do worse in the
- long term than one who passes.[8]
- The reason Y Combinator never negotiates valuations
- is that we're not professional negotiators, and don't want to turn
- into them.[9]
- There are two ways to do
- work you love: (a) to make money, then work
- on what you love, or (b) to get a job where you get paid to work on
- stuff you love. In practice the first phases of both
- consist mostly of unedifying schleps, and in (b) the second phase is less
- secure.Thanks to Sam Altman, Trevor Blackwell, Beau Hartshorne, Jessica
- Livingston, and Robert Morris for reading drafts of this.
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