superangels.txt 20 KB

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  1. Want to start a startup? Get funded by
  2. Y Combinator.
  3. October 2010After barely changing at all for decades, the startup funding
  4. business is now in what could, at least by comparison, be called
  5. turmoil. At Y Combinator we've seen dramatic changes in the funding
  6. environment for startups. Fortunately one of them is much higher
  7. valuations.The trends we've been seeing are probably not YC-specific. I wish
  8. I could say they were, but the main cause is probably just that we
  9. see trends first—partly because the startups we fund are very
  10. plugged into the Valley and are quick to take advantage of anything
  11. new, and partly because we fund so many that we have enough data
  12. points to see patterns clearly.What we're seeing now, everyone's probably going to be seeing in
  13. the next couple years. So I'm going to explain what we're seeing,
  14. and what that will mean for you if you try to raise money.Super-AngelsLet me start by describing what the world of startup funding used
  15. to look like. There used to be two sharply differentiated types
  16. of investors: angels and venture capitalists. Angels are individual
  17. rich people who invest small amounts of their own money, while VCs
  18. are employees of funds that invest large amounts of other people's.For decades there were just those two types of investors, but now
  19. a third type has appeared halfway between them: the so-called
  20. super-angels.
  21. [1]
  22. And VCs have been provoked by their arrival
  23. into making a lot of angel-style investments themselves. So the
  24. previously sharp line between angels and VCs has become hopelessly
  25. blurred.There used to be a no man's land between angels and VCs. Angels
  26. would invest $20k to $50k apiece, and VCs usually a million or more.
  27. So an angel round meant a collection of angel investments that
  28. combined to maybe $200k, and a VC round meant a series A round in
  29. which a single VC fund (or occasionally two) invested $1-5 million.The no man's land between angels and VCs was a very inconvenient
  30. one for startups, because it coincided with the amount many wanted
  31. to raise. Most startups coming out of Demo Day wanted to raise
  32. around $400k. But it was a pain to stitch together that much out
  33. of angel investments, and most VCs weren't interested in investments
  34. so small. That's the fundamental reason the super-angels have
  35. appeared. They're responding to the market.The arrival of a new type of investor is big news for startups,
  36. because there used to be only two and they rarely competed with one
  37. another. Super-angels compete with both angels and VCs. That's
  38. going to change the rules about how to raise money. I don't know
  39. yet what the new rules will be, but it looks like most of the changes
  40. will be for the better.A super-angel has some of the qualities of an angel, and some of
  41. the qualities of a VC. They're usually individuals, like angels.
  42. In fact many of the current super-angels were initially angels of
  43. the classic type. But like VCs, they invest other people's money.
  44. This allows them to invest larger amounts than angels: a typical
  45. super-angel investment is currently about $100k. They make investment
  46. decisions quickly, like angels. And they make a lot more investments
  47. per partner than VCs—up to 10 times as many.The fact that super-angels invest other people's money makes them
  48. doubly alarming to VCs. They don't just compete for startups; they
  49. also compete for investors. What super-angels really are is a new
  50. form of fast-moving, lightweight VC fund. And those of us in the
  51. technology world know what usually happens when something comes
  52. along that can be described in terms like that. Usually it's the
  53. replacement.Will it be? As of now, few of the startups that take money from
  54. super-angels are ruling out taking VC money. They're just postponing
  55. it. But that's still a problem for VCs. Some of the startups that
  56. postpone raising VC money may do so well on the angel money they
  57. raise that they never bother to raise more. And those who do raise
  58. VC rounds will be able to get higher valuations when they do. If
  59. the best startups get 10x higher valuations when they raise series
  60. A rounds, that would cut VCs' returns from winners at least tenfold.
  61. [2]So I think VC funds are seriously threatened by the super-angels.
  62. But one thing that may save them to some extent is the uneven
  63. distribution of startup outcomes: practically all the returns are
  64. concentrated in a few big successes. The expected value of a startup
  65. is the percentage chance it's Google. So to the extent that winning
  66. is a matter of absolute returns, the super-angels could win practically
  67. all the battles for individual startups and yet lose the war, if
  68. they merely failed to get those few big winners. And there's a
  69. chance that could happen, because the top VC funds have better
  70. brands, and can also do more for their portfolio companies.
  71. [3]Because super-angels make more investments per partner, they have
  72. less partner per investment. They can't pay as much attention to
  73. you as a VC on your board could. How much is that extra attention
  74. worth? It will vary enormously from one partner to another. There's
  75. no consensus yet in the general case. So for now this is something
  76. startups are deciding individually.Till now, VCs' claims about how much value they added were sort of
  77. like the government's. Maybe they made you feel better, but you
  78. had no choice in the matter, if you needed money on the scale only
  79. VCs could supply. Now that VCs have competitors, that's going to
  80. put a market price on the help they offer. The interesting thing
  81. is, no one knows yet what it will be.Do startups that want to get really big need the sort of advice and
  82. connections only the top VCs can supply? Or would super-angel money
  83. do just as well? The VCs will say you need them, and the super-angels
  84. will say you don't. But the truth is, no one knows yet, not even
  85. the VCs and super-angels themselves. All the super-angels know
  86. is that their new model seems promising enough to be worth trying,
  87. and all the VCs know is that it seems promising enough to worry
  88. about.RoundsWhatever the outcome, the conflict between VCs and super-angels is
  89. good news for founders. And not just for the obvious reason that
  90. more competition for deals means better terms. The whole shape of
  91. deals is changing.One of the biggest differences between angels and VCs is the amount
  92. of your company they want. VCs want a lot. In a series A round
  93. they want a third of your company, if they can get it. They don't
  94. care much how much they pay for it, but they want a lot because the
  95. number of series A investments they can do is so small. In a
  96. traditional series A investment, at least one partner from the VC
  97. fund takes a seat on your board.
  98. [4]
  99. Since board seats last about
  100. 5 years and each partner can't handle more than about 10 at once,
  101. that means a VC fund can only do about 2 series A deals per partner
  102. per year. And that means they need to get as much of the company
  103. as they can in each one. You'd have to be a very promising startup
  104. indeed to get a VC to use up one of his 10 board seats for only a
  105. few percent of you.Since angels generally don't take board seats, they don't have this
  106. constraint. They're happy to buy only a few percent of you. And
  107. although the super-angels are in most respects mini VC funds, they've
  108. retained this critical property of angels. They don't take board
  109. seats, so they don't need a big percentage of your company.Though that means you'll get correspondingly less attention from
  110. them, it's good news in other respects. Founders never really liked
  111. giving up as much equity as VCs wanted. It was a lot of the company
  112. to give up in one shot. Most founders doing series A deals would
  113. prefer to take half as much money for half as much stock, and then
  114. see what valuation they could get for the second half of the stock
  115. after using the first half of the money to increase its value. But
  116. VCs never offered that option.Now startups have another alternative. Now it's easy to raise angel
  117. rounds about half the size of series A rounds. Many of the startups
  118. we fund are taking this route, and I predict that will be true of
  119. startups in general.A typical big angel round might be $600k on a convertible note with
  120. a valuation cap of $4 million premoney. Meaning that when the note
  121. converts into stock (in a later round, or upon acquisition), the
  122. investors in that round will get .6 / 4.6, or 13% of the company.
  123. That's a lot less than the 30 to 40% of the company you usually
  124. give up in a series A round if you do it so early.
  125. [5]But the advantage of these medium-sized rounds is not just that
  126. they cause less dilution. You also lose less control. After an
  127. angel round, the founders almost always still have control of the
  128. company, whereas after a series A round they often don't. The
  129. traditional board structure after a series A round is two founders,
  130. two VCs, and a (supposedly) neutral fifth person. Plus series A
  131. terms usually give the investors a veto over various kinds of
  132. important decisions, including selling the company. Founders usually
  133. have a lot of de facto control after a series A, as long as things
  134. are going well. But that's not the same as just being able to do
  135. what you want, like you could before.A third and quite significant advantage of angel rounds is that
  136. they're less stressful to raise. Raising a traditional series A
  137. round has in the past taken weeks, if not months. When a VC firm
  138. can only do 2 deals per partner per year, they're careful about
  139. which they do. To get a traditional series A round you have to go
  140. through a series of meetings, culminating in a full partner meeting
  141. where the firm as a whole says yes or no. That's the really scary
  142. part for founders: not just that series A rounds take so long, but
  143. at the end of this long process the VCs might still say no. The
  144. chance of getting rejected after the full partner meeting averages
  145. about 25%. At some firms it's over 50%.Fortunately for founders, VCs have been getting a lot faster.
  146. Nowadays Valley VCs are more likely to take 2 weeks than 2 months.
  147. But they're still not as fast as angels and super-angels, the most
  148. decisive of whom sometimes decide in hours.Raising an angel round is not only quicker, but you get feedback
  149. as it progresses. An angel round is not an all or nothing thing
  150. like a series A. It's composed of multiple investors with varying
  151. degrees of seriousness, ranging from the upstanding ones who commit
  152. unequivocally to the jerks who give you lines like "come back to
  153. me to fill out the round." You usually start collecting money from
  154. the most committed investors and work your way out toward the
  155. ambivalent ones, whose interest increases as the round fills up.But at each point you know how you're doing. If investors turn
  156. cold you may have to raise less, but when investors in an angel
  157. round turn cold the process at least degrades gracefully, instead
  158. of blowing up in your face and leaving you with nothing, as happens
  159. if you get rejected by a VC fund after a full partner meeting.
  160. Whereas if investors seem hot, you can not only close the round
  161. faster, but now that convertible notes are becoming the norm,
  162. actually raise the price to reflect demand.ValuationHowever, the VCs have a weapon they can use against the super-angels,
  163. and they have started to use it. VCs have started making angel-sized
  164. investments too. The term "angel round" doesn't mean that all the
  165. investors in it are angels; it just describes the structure of the
  166. round. Increasingly the participants include VCs making investments
  167. of a hundred thousand or two. And when VCs invest in angel rounds
  168. they can do things that super-angels don't like. VCs are quite
  169. valuation-insensitive in angel rounds—partly because they are
  170. in general, and partly because they don't care that much about the
  171. returns on angel rounds, which they still view mostly as a way to
  172. recruit startups for series A rounds later. So VCs who invest in
  173. angel rounds can blow up the valuations for angels and super-angels
  174. who invest in them.
  175. [6]Some super-angels seem to care about valuations. Several turned
  176. down YC-funded startups after Demo Day because their valuations
  177. were too high. This was not a problem for the startups; by definition
  178. a high valuation means enough investors were willing to accept it.
  179. But it was mysterious to me that the super-angels would quibble
  180. about valuations. Did they not understand that the big returns
  181. come from a few big successes, and that it therefore mattered far
  182. more which startups you picked than how much you paid for them?After thinking about it for a while and observing certain other
  183. signs, I have a theory that explains why the super-angels may be
  184. smarter than they seem. It would make sense for super-angels to
  185. want low valuations if they're hoping to invest in startups that
  186. get bought early. If you're hoping to hit the next Google, you
  187. shouldn't care if the valuation is 20 million. But if you're looking
  188. for companies that are going to get bought for 30 million, you care.
  189. If you invest at 20 and the company gets bought for 30, you only
  190. get 1.5x. You might as well buy Apple.So if some of the super-angels were looking for companies that could
  191. get acquired quickly, that would explain why they'd care about
  192. valuations. But why would they be looking for those? Because
  193. depending on the meaning of "quickly," it could actually be very
  194. profitable. A company that gets acquired for 30 million is a failure
  195. to a VC, but it could be a 10x return for an angel, and moreover,
  196. a quick 10x return. Rate of return is what matters in
  197. investing—not the multiple you get, but the multiple per year.
  198. If a super-angel gets 10x in one year, that's a higher rate of
  199. return than a VC could ever hope to get from a company that took 6
  200. years to go public. To get the same rate of return, the VC would
  201. have to get a multiple of 10^6—one million x. Even Google
  202. didn't come close to that.So I think at least some super-angels are looking for companies
  203. that will get bought. That's the only rational explanation for
  204. focusing on getting the right valuations, instead of the right
  205. companies. And if so they'll be different to deal with than VCs.
  206. They'll be tougher on valuations, but more accommodating if you want
  207. to sell early.PrognosisWho will win, the super-angels or the VCs? I think the answer to
  208. that is, some of each. They'll each become more like one another.
  209. The super-angels will start to invest larger amounts, and the VCs
  210. will gradually figure out ways to make more, smaller investments
  211. faster. A decade from now the players will be hard to tell apart,
  212. and there will probably be survivors from each group.What does that mean for founders? One thing it means is that the
  213. high valuations startups are presently getting may not last forever.
  214. To the extent that valuations are being driven up by price-insensitive
  215. VCs, they'll fall again if VCs become more like super-angels and
  216. start to become more miserly about valuations. Fortunately if this
  217. does happen it will take years.The short term forecast is more competition between investors, which
  218. is good news for you. The super-angels will try to undermine the
  219. VCs by acting faster, and the VCs will try to undermine the
  220. super-angels by driving up valuations. Which for founders will
  221. result in the perfect combination: funding rounds that close fast,
  222. with high valuations.But remember that to get that combination, your startup will have
  223. to appeal to both super-angels and VCs. If you don't seem like you
  224. have the potential to go public, you won't be able to use VCs to
  225. drive up the valuation of an angel round.There is a danger of having VCs in an angel round: the so-called
  226. signalling risk. If VCs are only doing it in the hope of investing
  227. more later, what happens if they don't? That's a signal to everyone
  228. else that they think you're lame.How much should you worry about that? The seriousness of signalling
  229. risk depends on how far along you are. If by the next time you
  230. need to raise money, you have graphs showing rising revenue or
  231. traffic month after month, you don't have to worry about any signals
  232. your existing investors are sending. Your results will speak for
  233. themselves.
  234. [7]Whereas if the next time you need to raise money you won't yet have
  235. concrete results, you may need to think more about the message your
  236. investors might send if they don't invest more. I'm not sure yet
  237. how much you have to worry, because this whole phenomenon of VCs
  238. doing angel investments is so new. But my instincts tell me you
  239. don't have to worry much. Signalling risk smells like one of those
  240. things founders worry about that's not a real problem. As a rule,
  241. the only thing that can kill a good startup is the startup itself.
  242. Startups hurt themselves way more often than competitors hurt them,
  243. for example. I suspect signalling risk is in this category too.One thing YC-funded startups have been doing to mitigate the risk
  244. of taking money from VCs in angel rounds is not to take too much
  245. from any one VC. Maybe that will help, if you have the luxury of
  246. turning down money.Fortunately, more and more startups will. After decades of competition
  247. that could best be described as intramural, the startup funding
  248. business is finally getting some real competition. That should
  249. last several years at least, and maybe a lot longer. Unless there's
  250. some huge market crash, the next couple years are going to be a
  251. good time for startups to raise money. And that's exciting because
  252. it means lots more startups will happen.
  253. Notes[1]
  254. I've also heard them called "Mini-VCs" and "Micro-VCs." I
  255. don't know which name will stick.There were a couple predecessors. Ron Conway had angel funds
  256. starting in the 1990s, and in some ways First Round Capital is closer to a
  257. super-angel than a VC fund.[2]
  258. It wouldn't cut their overall returns tenfold, because investing
  259. later would probably (a) cause them to lose less on investments
  260. that failed, and (b) not allow them to get as large a percentage
  261. of startups as they do now. So it's hard to predict precisely what
  262. would happen to their returns.[3]
  263. The brand of an investor derives mostly from the success of
  264. their portfolio companies. The top VCs thus have a big brand
  265. advantage over the super-angels. They could make it self-perpetuating
  266. if they used it to get all the best new startups. But I don't think
  267. they'll be able to. To get all the best startups, you have to do
  268. more than make them want you. You also have to want them; you have
  269. to recognize them when you see them, and that's much harder.
  270. Super-angels will snap up stars that VCs miss. And that will cause
  271. the brand gap between the top VCs and the super-angels gradually
  272. to erode.[4]
  273. Though in a traditional series A round VCs put two partners
  274. on your board, there are signs now that VCs may begin to conserve
  275. board seats by switching to what used to be considered an angel-round
  276. board, consisting of two founders and one VC. Which is also to the
  277. founders' advantage if it means they still control the company.[5]
  278. In a series A round, you usually have to give up more than
  279. the actual amount of stock the VCs buy, because they insist you
  280. dilute yourselves to set aside an "option pool" as well. I predict
  281. this practice will gradually disappear though.[6]
  282. The best thing for founders, if they can get it, is a convertible
  283. note with no valuation cap at all. In that case the money invested
  284. in the angel round just converts into stock at the valuation of the
  285. next round, no matter how large. Angels and super-angels tend not
  286. to like uncapped notes. They have no idea how much of the company
  287. they're buying. If the company does well and the valuation of the
  288. next round is high, they may end up with only a sliver of it. So
  289. by agreeing to uncapped notes, VCs who don't care about valuations
  290. in angel rounds can make offers that super-angels hate to match.[7]
  291. Obviously signalling risk is also not a problem if you'll
  292. never need to raise more money. But startups are often mistaken
  293. about that.Thanks to Sam Altman, John Bautista, Patrick Collison, James
  294. Lindenbaum, Reid Hoffman, Jessica Livingston and Harj Taggar
  295. for reading drafts
  296. of this.